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Since the end of the Cold War, the Balkan Peninsula has been witnessing various 
conflicts. The Former Republic of Yugoslavia has become a theater of atrocious 
confrontations between people with common history and traditions. The wars in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo, two components of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, have 
entailed the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the multinational 
efforts to stop violence in this region. Since 1990, NATO’s new objectives are reducing 
the risk of conflict, building increased mutual understanding and confidence among all 
European states, helping to manage crises affecting the security of the Allies, and 
expanding the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in 
dealing with common security problems. 
This thesis describes the characteristics of conflict and conflict resolution, with an 
emphasis on the factors that make a third party intervention in conflict resolution "ideal." 
It will elaborate on NATO’s diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict situations, providing an 
overview, analysis and evaluation of NATO's intervention as a third party in the conflicts 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Emphasis will be placed on whether or not NATO 
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Despite the global changes and new worldwide trends, the post-Cold War era has 
been characterized by intrastate conflicts, such as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
Oppression, ethnic cleansing and genocide, segregation, and forced assimilation are still 
strategies and policies considered within many governments’ range of choices. It is 
difficult for both adversaries to deal constructively with such types of conflicts, and for 
other parties to help them to settle their conflicts. Achieving conflict resolution depends 
on the disputing sides' willingness to work towards it.  
Therefore, conflict management and resolution frequently require the services of a 
third-party pilot, to help reduce the chances of escalation and crisis. This takes place 
mainly due to the parties’ biased and limiting reciprocal perceptions of conflict issues 
that prevent them from seeing mutually satisfactory, mutually beneficial, or integrative 
options, even when they have the desire to settle their discrepancies. The third party is a 
neutral and impartial person(s)/organization(s) that helps the conflicting parties to narrow 
gaps and then to bridge them, looks for a common ground, narrows the differences, finds 
mutual interest, persuades diverse views to reach a final point of, if not agreement, at 
least, understanding. 
After presenting the characteristics of conflict and conflict resolution, this thesis 
introduces seven criteria for an “ideal third party” action in conflict resolution. For 
example, an ideal third party should have a plan established prior to any course of action; 
it should approach a "win-win" strategy to satisfy both its interest(s) and those of the 
opposing sides; it should remain neutral, acting as a catalyst within the conflict; it should 
 xii
act as a communicator, formulator, or manipulator, to assist the parties in settling their 
differences when the conflict requires; it should not seek quick-fix solutions or attempt to 
rush the mediation process, no matter the circumstances, while taking the concerns of 
each party seriously; and it should sense what variant to use; if coercive or deterrent 
means are used, making its rewards and threats ("carrots-and-sticks") credible. Fulfilling 
all seven criteria in the table qualifies the third party as "ideal"; failing to fulfill any of the 
seven criteria means that the party is not "ideal."  
NATO has been one of the third parties intervening in the conflicts that took place 
in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. It has taken decisive actions to halt armed 
conflicts in this region. NATO’s participation in the mediation processes has been based 
on its policy to work for a country in which all ethnic groups are allowed to live in peace 
and security. NATO wanted to demonstrate that ethnic cleansing - mass deportation, 
mass killings, and mass terror - have no place in the Europe of the 21st century. After 
describing NATO’s intervention in the resolution of the conflicts in the Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia, this thesis analyzes how well NATO met the seven criteria for an “ideal 
third party.” 
This thesis finds that NATO failed to intervene in a constructive way to mediate a 
democratic and peaceful disassociation of former republics from Yugoslavia. It did not 
meet all seven criteria of the many factors that affect being an ideal third party, therefore 
it cannot be viewed as an ideal third party. NATO has been found to be more oriented 
toward coercive and deterrent approaches (as it possesses a multitude of coercive 
capabilities and assets), rather than toward negotiating (mediation-based) ones. Despite 
 xiii 
these limitations, NATO’s interventions as a third party during the Bosnia and Kosovo 
conflicts did have their successes, which also will be outlined in this thesis.  
After presenting arguments why NATO is not an ideal third party, this thesis 
makes several suggestions for future courses of actions by NATO as a third party 











































The author would like to thank Professor Bruneau and Professor Roberts for their 
invaluable guidance, support, and patience during the work in performing this 
investigation.  
The author would like to thank Professor Beth Summe for her assistance in 
providing advice, support, and understanding in the editing of this thesis. 










































Violence closes doors and minds. Good conflict 
resolution opens them. [Ref.1]  
 
 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION. 
 
The end of the Cold War has not necessarily made the world less dangerous. 
Interstate conflicts still occur. These types of conflicts continue as regional leaders fight 
out issues of rank and relations between one another.  
Intrastate conflicts1 also are the characteristic of current world affairs. These types 
of conflicts, although they can be settled for a certain period of time, are rarely resolved. 
Furthermore, the longer conflict escalation lasts, the worse humanitarian problems 
become. Not only is it difficult for the adversaries to deal constructively with them, due 
to their incompatible attitudes and behavior, but it also is complicated to for outsiders to 






                                                 
1 Such as anti-regime wars or political and ideological conflicts, ethnonationalist conflicts, 
interethnic conflicts, genocide. 
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There are no simple or easy solutions to contemporary intrastate conflicts where 
numerous parties are involved, where the issues in dispute are various and complicated, 
and where the level of hatred between the parties is high.  Therefore, the responsibility 
and capability for dealing with these conflicts is not a matter of state policy anymore. 
States are the prime agents for producing policies responsive to incipient conflicts. When 
they fail, other states need to consider preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution and 
management. Actors who are not one of the primary adversaries can often make valuable 
contributions to conflict solving. Thus, new agencies and powers, or regional 
organizations, including ready peacekeeping forces, have been called to play a role in 
dealing with conflicts.  
Considering these circumstances, one could argue that conflict management and 
resolution frequently require the services of a third-party pilot, to help reduce the chances 
of escalation and crisis. Its functions are, inter alia: helping the conflicting parties to 
narrow gaps and then to bridge them; looking for common ground and narrowing the 
differences; finding the mutual interest; persuading diverse views to reach a final point 
of, if not agreement, at least understanding.  
For centuries, the history of international relations in the Balkans has been 
marked by moments of conflict alternating with times of peace, attempts to return to a 
peaceful life and the sudden collapse into the abyss of war. This is the reason why this 
region has been considered  "the powder keg of Europe." [Ref.2] The high state of 
instability and conflict in this region has been determined by various factors, mainly 
domestic: political and economic instability; inter-ethnic factors and problems of 
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minorities; aggressive nationalism and ultranationalism (sometimes fueled and 
aggravated by social problems). 
Foreign influences also have contributed to the tensions and conflicts in this 
region: tension among neighboring states; tendencies/attempts at regional hegemony; the 
potential proliferation of mass destruction and high technology; disproportionate transfers 
of conventional arms; international terrorism; and migration and crime (including drug 
and person trafficking).  
The Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is a Balkan country. For many years 
(during Tito’s presidency, from 1945 to 1980), it functioned as a nation-state by 
providing a peaceful compromise to the conflicting, multifaceted, and perennial "national 
questions" posed by its component countries or provinces. At that time, Yugoslavia was 
not only a mosaic of different ethnic nations, but also a system that was developed to 
accommodate these differences.  
After 1980, it collapsed. Two blocs with irreconcilable goals were established: the 
federal (centralist) bloc (Serbia and Montenegro) versus the confederal (secessionist) bloc 
(Croatia, Slovenia, and later Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Serbian elite 
were firmly declaring the legitimate right to the defense of territorial integrity 
(inviolability of borders) and sovereignty of FRY, while the opposite bloc was firmly 
claiming the legitimate right to self-determination. In addition, after Tito's death, the 
elites' authoritarian spirit and inability to compromise, deeply contradicted the 
multiethnic composition of the society.  
Nationalism and ethnonationalism, characterized by a rigid ideology and the 
aggressive politicization of national identities, as well as by the connection between 
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religious belief and nationality, have characterized Yugoslavia since 1980. Conflicts 
started in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, where the conflicting parties concentrated, in 
the first place, on achieving their nationalist and political aims. The Serbian abuses  (such 
as ethnic cleansing and genocide) were directed against opposition parties or religious 
groups, the independent media, student organizations, independent trade unions, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civic activists, in short, against anyone who 
potentially threatened the ruling elite's hold on power.  
As conflicts arose in the former Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) joined the multinational efforts to settle the conflicts in this region. 
It has both means and assets to cope with the very changeable nature of current conflicts. 
As a third party intervening in these conflicts, NATO has taken decisive actions to halt 
armed conflicts in this region: in the diplomatic field, convincing parties to end their 
disputes through meetings, and in the military field, alleviating refugee and other 
humanitarian problems through peacekeeping and relief. Therefore, the Atlantic 
Alliance's role in conflict/crisis management and in peace operations role has emerged as 
response to the evolution of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
The aim of this thesis is to elaborate on NATO’s diplomatic efforts to resolve 
conflict situations. It will provide an overview, analysis and evaluation of NATO's 
intervention as a third party in the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
Emphasis will be made on what factors/criteria make a third party intervening in conflict 







To older generations, NATO was the cornerstone of the Cold War policy to 
"contain" the Soviet Union. To younger generations, NATO is a key-actor whenever 
there is a security challenge in Europe. It is important to assess the Atlantic Alliance’s 
capability (both diplomatic and military) in resolving conflicts, because NATO is the 
security and defense instrument of first choice. Without NATO support, the United 
Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international 
organizations could not have matched the ferocity of the Serbs and settled the conflicts. 
NATO will have a role as long as people like Slobodan Milosevic exist in Europe.  
Conflict resolution is one of the most important fields in political science, as 
nowadays conflicts require new ways, techniques, and assets to be solved. NATO has 
many of these techniques at its disposal. As almost all of the contemporary conflicts 
demand multiplicity of intermediary roles and functions, knowing how well NATO has 
behaved in terms of the "ideal third party" during the conflicts in the Former Republic of 
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II. CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY 
 
Conflict is the product of unmet needs and unrecognized differences, of perceived 
present or future incompatibility of plans, goals or actions, and of unacknowledged 
issues. It is characterized by high complexity and fluidity. The trajectory of a particular 
conflict is never absolutely fixed from beginning to end, despite the fact that sometimes it 
may appear to be so. Small unexpected gestures, actions and non-actions can create very 
large changes in outcome. Accordingly, the methods used to deal with conflict are 
various, proportional to both the nature of conflict and the turning points in its pathway. 
Often conflict requires the presence of a neutral third party for resolution. 
This chapter focuses on conflict and its types, as well as the various ways and 
methods to deal with it. It also describes the characteristics and means of those who 
intervene to resolve a conflict.  
 
A. WHAT IS CONFLICT? WHAT ARE THE TYPOLOGIES OF 
CONFLICT?  
 
Conflict is a natural and very typical phenomenon in every type of human 
relationship, and at every level: from intrapersonal (the realm of psychology) to global. 
The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as the "competitive or opposing action of 
incompatibles: antagonistic state or action (as of divergent ideas, interests, or persons)." 
Conflict, thus, is one form of social interaction that involves at least two parties who 
disagree. The two parties argue with each other and dispute issues they both care about. 
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Conflicts occur between persons, organizations, communal groups, and states, reflecting 
relationship within a family, a community, and an international system. [Ref.3] Conflicts 
can be related to specific interests or processes within organizations and social systems. 
Interest disputes are immediately provoked by broken agreements, unobserved norms, 
and competition in the use of resources. Conflicts can be long lasting, destructive, or a 
combination of the two. [Ref.4] The nature of conflict depends on how problems are 
defined and framed. Generally, struggles between opposing forces touch on differences in 
opinions and contending interests.  
According to the Ethnic Conflicts Research Project (ECOR) [Ref.5], there are 
different types of conflicts. Conflicts can be structured as follows: the resource frame 
(conflict in terms of the what the participants want out of the conflict, as for instance 
many conflicts are over territory), the interest frame (the underlying needs of the 
participants in conflict), and the identity frame (what the conflict is for, what it serves), 
which are considered conflict identification factors. Examples of conflict include the 
following: 
ü Anti-regime wars or political and ideological conflicts, known as State versus 
Insurrection (SvI), aim at replacing the current government or changing the 
sociopolitical system. They encompass varying forms, such as liberation 
movements vs colonial powers, popular movements and/or sociorevolutionary 
movements vs authoritarian state, and destabilization or reestablishment of a 
status ante. 
ü Ethnonationalist conflicts, generally occurring as intrastate conflicts opposing 
states and national groups (State versus Nation, SvN), are the most frequent 
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type of contemporary armed conflicts and wars. They are long-lasting, and 
sometimes include inter-state conflicts (MSvN). 
ü Interstate conflicts, State versus State (SvS), are also considered a “classic 
type” of warfare. 
ü Decolonization wars of foreign-state occupation (FSO) have a dominant 
ethnonational character. 
ü Interethnic conflicts serve the particular collective (nonprivate) interests of 
actors. The issues regard tribalism, clan conflict, chauvinism, narrow 
nationalism, along with economic aspects.  
ü Gang wars occurring between nonstate actors, mixed with criminal elements 
exist mainly in situations of state collapse. Actors act according to particular 
or even private interests, so the economic aspects prevail.  
ü Genocide, as state-organized mass murder and crimes against humanity, 
illustrates the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals belonging to a 
particular national, ethnic, “racial,” or religious group. It is the most atrocious 
type of mass violence, which differs from warfare in that it targets civilians 
(noncombatants)  as victims, including old people, children, and babies.  






B.  METHODS/TECHNIQUES TO DEAL WITH CONFLICT.  
 
One of the key-questions regarding conflicts is how to manage and resolve them. 
As modern societies have become more complex, problems of managing conflict have 
become cardinal, with broad implications for human well-being and social change.  
Conflict resolution is the process of “concluding a dispute or a conflict in which 
the disputing parties, with or without the assistance of mediators, negotiate or, otherwise, 
strive toward a mutually acceptable agreement or understanding, taking into account each 
other’s concerns.” [Ref.6] It often entails reframing the conflict so that it is regarded as a 
shared problem, which requires changes in the psychological environment. Conflict 
resolution, therefore, aims at helping alienated parties analyze the causes of the conflict 
and explore strategies for changes in the system that generate it. Conflict Resolution is 
successful, if the future causes of conflicts are eliminated without the use of threats. 
Collaborative processes, rather than power bargaining, can help discover 
accommodations that bring net advantages to all concerned. In general, any given 
conflict’s susceptibility to a win-win solution depends on the nature of the issues, the 
configuration of interests, and the availability of alternative options, as well as the 
commitment of parties to problem solving. Constructive conflict resolution is more likely 
when the parties cooperate with and respect each other, approach the conflict as a 
problem to be solved by using their creativity, see it as creatively challenging, focus on 
underlying needs, not positions, and behave in nonviolent ways.  
Conflict resolution, thus, is a multidisciplinary field, a mix of psychology, 
philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, and law. It represents a 
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convergence of means (or arrangements for the future), not necessarily participants’ 
interests or perspectives, since participants commonly come to support the same 
arrangement or agreement for very different reasons. Conflict resolution does not 
necessarily resolve tensions between parties. It may simply sufficiently align matters to 
permit each party to make enough progress on their desired ends, preferring "a state of 
agreement" rather than an uncertain and stressful "state of disagreement."  
Various types of conflict management and conflict resolution techniques have 
been developed to deal with conflict. Four of them will be examined here, based on the 
level of agreement between the parties in conflict: coercion, deterrence, negotiation 
between two parties (including the Alternative Dispute Resolution model (ADR), and the 
basic needs model), and the third-party intervention.  
 
1. Coercive Diplomacy. 
 
Coercive diplomacy for defensive purposes, in Alexander L. George’s [Ref.7] 
view attempts “to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.” Coercive 
diplomacy for offensive use2 attempts to “persuade a victim to give up something of 
value without putting up resistance.” Therefore, coercive diplomacy is a response to an 
action already carried out. Coercive diplomacy aims to support a demand on an adversary 
with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to 
persuade them that it is in their best interest to submit to the demand.  
                                                 
2 Also known as “blackmail strategy.”  
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Coercive diplomacy grants the defender the opportunity to achieve reasonable 
objectives in a crisis with less cost, and it has less chance than a war to alter the future 
relationship between the parties in conflict. Coercive diplomacy suggests a hierarchical 
policy of solving problems. It resembles an ultimatum, which consists of a specific 
demand on the opponent, a time limit for compliance, and a threat of punishment for 





Deterrence, on the other hand, is a threat of punishment to discourage an 
opponent from undertaking a not yet started action, or prospect of reward. Deterrence, in 
Alexander L. George and Richard Stoke’s view is “persuasion of one’s opponent that the 
costs and/or risks of a given course of action he  might take outweigh its benefits.” [Ref.8] 
Like coercive diplomacy, however, deterrence also implies a hierarchical policy of 
solving problems. 
Neither coercion nor the deterrent approach results in discovery and removal of 
roots of conflict and cannot prevent the occurrence of similar events. The third technique 





3. Negotiation between Two Parties. 
 
A negotiation situation is one in which there is a conflict of interests. What one 
side wants is not necessarily what the other wants, yet both sides prefer to search for 
solutions, rather than giving in or breaking-off contact. As an "alternative" to either force 
or formal authority, negotiation is a formal process by which two or more parties try to 
reach an agreement. Every desire for satisfaction is, at least, potentially an occasion for 
negotiation. Whenever people exchange opinions with the intention of changing 
relationships, or whenever they converge towards agreement, they are negotiating. 
According to Ikle, negotiation is a process in which “explicit proposals are put 
forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the 
realization of common interest where conflict interests are present.” [Ref. 9] It aims at 
avoiding the use of force to resolve the conflict. Negotiation requires compromises and 
concessions by both sides of the conflict, without expectations about winning or losing. 
Any method of negotiation may be considered based upon three criteria: it should 
produce an agreement (if agreement is possible) that meets the legitimate interests of 
each side to the extent possible, resolve conflict interests fairly, last throughout the 
process, and take community interests into account; it should be efficient; and it should 
improve or at least not damage the relationship between parties involved in conflict.  
There are various negotiation models, but current interest is in negotiation 
processes, which seek “win-win” solutions and try to improve relationships. There are 
interest-based negotiations, in which parties are encouraged to seek workable solutions 
accommodating the needs and interests of all parties in the negotiation. Additionally, 
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there are positional negotiations, in which one party takes a position on an issue, trying to 
compel the opponent to accept that position or something close to it. [Ref.10] In a 
successful negotiation, everyone wins, as the objective should be agreement, and not 
triumph or success. Under these circumstances, the point of a successful negotiation is to 
shift the situation to a "win-win" situation, even if it looks like a "win- lose" situation. 
Almost all negotiation processes have at least some elements of “win-win.”  
A particular case of negotiation is the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 
ADR is an effort to arrive at mutua lly acceptable decisions; it is based on the belief that 
individuals should be able to resolve their differences without depending on coercive 
means. ADR processes cover early neutral evaluation, mediation, non-binding arbitration, 
negotiated rule-making, third-party intervention. It involves shaping the process to 
minimize the destructive elements promoting productive uses of conflict. All these 
processes involve a more voluntary, free speech and rationality-based form of 
cooperation.  
As in the negotiation case, the intent of ADR is to achieve an agreement that is 
satisfying and acceptable to all parties, achieving a “win-win” solution. “Win-win” 
solutions involve interest-based versus positional bargaining. Positional bargaining 
comprises a series of positions (alternative solutions that meet particular interests or 
need) for other parties to reach agreement; whereas interest-based bargaining involves the 
collaborative effort of all parties to jointly meet each other’s needs while satisfying 
mutual interests. The underlying premise is problem solving via peaceful, non-
threatening means. The premises also include the following: defining the problem rather 
than proposing solutions or taking positions; identifying the situation as an opportunity 
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for collaboration; negotiating over interests versus positions; analyzing a wide spectrum 
of alternatives; agreeing on criteria by which to evaluate alternatives, and the like. 
The voluntary nature of ADR, and its generally accepted non-confrontational and 
non-adversarial features along with the flexibility in terms of settlement make it a 
valuable conflict resolution process. 
Another type of conflict resolution technique derives from the basic needs model. 
The model assumes that unfulfilled needs are the primary sources of conflict and violence 
and that if the normal human being’s aggression level is low, then basic needs are thought 
to be met. If they are not, then basic needs are thought to be unfulfilled. Thus, the 
satisfaction of basic needs is essential to non-adversarial and non-confrontational 
problem solving, because parties perceive they are in a “win-win” situation, or approach 
the negotiation wanting to satisfy both their own needs and the other’s needs. 
 
4. Third-Party Intervention. 
 
Conflict resolution may be accomplished with or without a third party 
intervention, which includes inter alia mediation and arbitration.  
Often, parties have difficulty negotiating directly. Therefore, the presence of a 
third party (negotiator, mediator) is needed to help produce a “mutually acceptable 
solution.” [Ref.11] It represents a neutral and impartial person(s)/organization(s) that 
act(s) as a catalyst within the conflict, without imposing a solution on the parties, making 
a decision for, or giving any legal advice to the parties. 
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Mediation is a form of third-party intervention in conflict. It is a voluntary and 
confidential conference between two disputing parties and a third party (mediator) that 
assists the parties in discussing, negotiating and achieving solution to their problem. 
Conference means that the mediator has no power to make decisions independent of the 
parties. Only the parties can make decisions. Voluntary means that the parties need not 
agree on any resolution and may refuse to participate or cease participating at any time. 
Confidential favors open discussions without fear of statements being used against the 
party making them, and protecting the mediator from being used to benefit one side or the 
other.  
To fulfill its objectives, mediation must be made acceptable to the adversaries in 
the conflict, who must cooperate diplomatically with the intervenor. Consequently, the 
power in mediation (often referred to as leverage), namely the “ability to move a party in 
an intended direction” [Ref.12] highly depends on the parties. According to William 
Zartman and Saadia Touval [Ref.13] there are five sources of a mediator’s leverage: 
persuasion (the capacity to depict a favorable future), extraction (the capacity to entail an 
enticing position from each party), termination (the ability to withdraw from mediation), 
deprivation (the capacity to retain resources from one party or to transfer them to the 
other), and gratification (the capability to add resources to the result). 
In the case of conflict where direct contact between parties is impossible, the 
mediator can serve as a communicator, acting as a conduit, opening contacts, and 
carrying messages, in order to avoid parties’ talking one another, and to help parties make 
concessions without appearing weak or losing face. [Ref.14]  
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In other situations, when conflict may prevent parties from conceiving ways out 
of the dispute, mediation requires a mediator as formulator who persuades the sides or 
suggests solutions to their discord. [Ref.15] Moreover, if there are situations when 
reaching an agreement is hindered by the apparently minor size of the outcome, the 
negotiation/mediation process requires the mediator to act as a manipulator, persuading 
the parties of its point(s) of view with regard to the solution. [Ref.16] 
The motives of a third party to intervene in a conflict differ from case to case. 
However, the main reasons stated by mediators are conflict reduction and the desire to 
make peace. There are, of course, self- interest motivations for mediators’ intervention in 
conflict situations, such as seek for a special relationship with the parties involved in 
conflict, and a desire to extend and increase influence. [Ref.17]  
The most powerful third party element is arbitration. Arbitration is a method of 
resolving differences or disputes between two (or more) parties over the establishment, 
interpretation or application of the terms and conditions of a contract. It involves an 
independent third party that is either required by law or requested by the parties to make 
an award on the disputed issue(s) after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments. 
An arbitrator analyzes both sides’ understanding, examines evidence relating to the case, 
and then makes a determination of who is right and who is wrong, or how a conflict 
should be settled. [Ref.18] Usually, the arbitrator’s decision is binding and cannot be 
appealed. Thus, the arbitrator is the most powerful type of intermediary. Arbitration is 
successful when the parties simply want a settlement, without any concern for losing 
control of the process or the outcome. 
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C. WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN “IDEAL THIRD 
PARTY”? 
 
As earlier stated, some conflicts cannot be resolved without the help of an 
intermediary, a third party. This takes place mainly due to the parties’ biased and limiting 
reciprocal perceptions of conflict issues that prevent them from seeing mutually 
satisfactory, mutually beneficial, or integrative options, even when they have the desire to 
settle their discrepancies. It is in such cases that third parties can be the most helpful. By 
bringing to the conflict their own knowledge and experience, their own perspective, and, 
of course, their own power, they make previously unconsidered options visible and 
feasible. The issue is what are the characteristics of an “ideal” type of a third party 
intervening in a conflict; in other words, what does a third party have to do for an 
effective and successful conflict resolution? 
Since successful conflict resolution has, as Ho-Won Jo puts it, “a preventive 
effect on future conflicts by eliminating the possible causes of problems without using 
threats” [Ref.19], an ideal third party is the party that is skillful enough to annihilate the 
roots of conflict, and stop the occurrence of similar events. Under these circumstances, 
resolving a small issue that depends on an overarching one, without eliminating the 
causes of that overarching conflict, is not a successful resolution at all. The roots of the 
dispute must be removed. In addition, an ideal third party is the party that, however 
urgent the necessity to resolve a particular conflict, does not seek quick-fix solutions or 
attempt to rush the mediation process. The third party has to take seriously the concerns 
of a party. 
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To achieve that end, a third party intervening in a conflict must prove its ability of 
transformation of relationships, and reduce the sense of isolation or singularity of the 
parties.  
A potent third party plans its mediation development in advance, assuming that it 
would be helpful during conflict resolution to be able to look back on a plan.  
In general, most successful negotiators start off assuming collaborative 
(integrative) or “win-win”-type negotiation. Most skillful third parties try for a “win-win” 
or aim at a situation where both parties feel like they win. This is because negotiations 
tend to go much better if conflicting parties perceive they are in a “win-win” situation or 
both sides approach the negotiation wanting to satisfy both their own needs and the 
other’s needs.  
Although mediation in negotiation or transformation is the main characteristic for 
a successful third party, there are cases when mediator’s strategy must also embody other 
elements of conflict resolution, with the third party trying to remain neutral throughout 
the entire trajectory of the conflict.  
Certainly, there are situations when, due to the very destructive state of conflict, 
bias is required, as well as the third party’s support for one of the parties in conflict. On 
the other hand, mediators, although not allowed to take sides, may allow themselves a 
certain degree of partiality permitting themselves to express their preference concerning 
the conflict resolution result. Accordingly, if required, the mediator can serve as a 
communicator, formulator or manipulator. 
There are also situations when the nature of conflict demands the third party to 
use coercion and deterrent means. An ideal third party must know very well what to 
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demand of the opponents, and whether and how to create a sense of urgency for 
compliance with the demand, without imposing an ultimatum or, the nature and size of 
punishment, as well as, how to utilize the “carrot-and-stick” [Ref.20] approach.  
In this context, a successful third party must couple its threat of punishment with 
positive inducements to encourage the adversary to comply with the demand. Both 
threats of punishment and rewards have to be credible to seriously be taken into account 
by the other parties involved in conflict. On the other hand, an ideal third party must have 
the ability to sense what variant [Ref.21] of the coercive diplomacy strategy is the best to 
make use of during its intervention in conflict. In addition, it must consider that the 
opponent is not  “rational” [Ref.22]; in other words, the third party does not have to 
expect that the adversary would behave, or react in a certain way, based on its 
calculations or speculations. The third party has to be aware that multiple external and 
internal factors influence the opponent’s behavior, and its capability to receive and assess 
new, changing, and challenging information.  
 
D. WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND 
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION? 
 
Successful negotiation and third party- intervention grant opening for 
communication between disputing parties, and bring positive changes in their 
relationship. An effective conflict settlement facilitates the attenuation of a sense of 
isolation, a fear of abandonment, generating a belief in others. Disagreements and 
arguments are successfully managed if extreme polarization, physical violence, and 
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rancor are avoided. Successful efforts to limit escalation of disputes can lead to build 
interpersonal trust that prevents the interpretation of the situation in extreme terms. Thus, 
transformation in the course of conflict and relationship are outcomes of successful 
negotiation and third-party intervention.  
Transformation reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself. It 
implies that conflict is something that should be ended. Conflict transformation is a 
prescriptive concept. It suggests that left alone, conflict can have destructive 
consequences. Therefore it is important to alter it or transform it so that self- images, 
relationships, and social structures improve and are not aggrieved by the conflict. 
Transformation involves changing perceptions of issues, actions, and other people or 
groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences 
between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can work to improve 
mutual understanding. Even when people’s interests, values, and needs are different, or 
non-reconcilable, progress is made when each group gains a relatively accurate 
understanding of the other. Thus, Louis Kriesberg views transformation as a 
“fundamental and enduring change away from a protracted, destructive struggle between 
adversaries toward a constructive accommodation between them.” [Ref.23] 
Transformation involves transforming the way conflict is expressed, as it results in either 
reconciliation between opponents or a new conflict, which this time, is more 
constructively conducted. In this case, the adversaries must recognize each other’s claims 
and humanity, and begin to view their previously conflicting goals as reconcilable. 
Transformation comprises four stages [Ref.24], va rying in duration and irreversibility. 
 22
During the first phase, exploratory, members of one side may analyze the 
possibility for suitable accommodation. Discussions take place either among parties in 
conflict alone, or with the support of a third party. 
During the second phase, Initial Signals and Actions, tentative probes may be 
dismissed as tricks or reduced as not representing the position of authoritative 
representatives of the other side. This is usually accompanied by explicit statements and 
facts, in order to be effective. De-escalation of conflict may start when one party begins 
making concessions and compromises, inviting the other party to do the same. The aim, 
(even if it sometimes requires time and resources), is cooperative relations via 
conciliatory moves by both sides.  
During the third phase, Reaching Agreements and Understanding, 
accommodations between opponents, which develop gradually, are usually marked by 
agreements on specific conflictual issues, or confidence-building measures (CBMs). 
These measures ensure opponents that neither side will take or politically prepare surprise 
military actions against the other.  
During the fourth phase, Implementation and Institutionalization, the parties, with 
or without the intervention of a third party, make sure that the above mentioned 
agreements and measures are observed and implemented, without any infringement.  
Conflict transformation is the result of a mix of circumstances and interpretations 
of those circumstances. It entails reaching an agreement and changing the relationship. 
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III.    DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND 
KOSOVO 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had its fiftieth anniversary in 1999, which 
made it the oldest alliance ever. Its long life is impressive, as alliances go. Since its 
inception, NATO has worked for the achievement of its essential purpose: “safeguarding 
the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter,” [Ref.25] which reaffirms the inherent 
right of individual or collective defense. Over the years, NATO has succeeded in 
protecting its member states and in guaranteeing their security without being involved in 
an Article 5 collective defense contingency. [Ref.26]  
The current international environment has new characteristics: there are more 
frequent risks, including interethnic and religious disputes, drug trafficking, organized 
crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruc tion. Under these circumstances, 
conflicts have become more frequent. Intrastate warfare and nonwar types of mass 
violence, such as genocide and mass murder3 have dominated the international relations 
sphere after the Cold War. NATO has taken various measures to prevent and solve 
conflicts, as its purpose is to enhance the Euro-Atlantic stability, well being, and 
freedom. In addition, stability and peace in South Eastern Europe has also become a 
                                                 
3 I.e. the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo. 
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priority on the new NATO agenda. That is why NATO has been one of the third parties 
intervening in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
This chapter describes the Alliance’s role during the Cold War and its aftermath, 
as well as its role in the conflicts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
A. NATO'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. 
 
1. NATO during the Cold War. 
 
By 1949 the Cold War between the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) was underway. In the years after World War II, faced with 
the pressing need for economic reconstruction, Western European countries and their 
North American allies feared the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. They 
viewed these actions as threats to international stability and peace. Therefore, they 
decided to develop a common defense system and to strengthen the ties between them in 
a manner that would enable resisting further use of the expansionist policies and methods 
of the USSR. 
The signature of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 by Benelux, France, and the 
United Kingdom [Ref.27] marked the determination of these Western European members 
to collective defense. In addition, negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the 
United States, took place for the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on 
security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. 
Norway, Denmark, Italy, Iceland, and Portugal were invited to take part in this process. 
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As a result, the Treaty of Washington was signed in April 1949, which founded a 
common security system based on a partnership among these twelve countries. Greece 
and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, along with the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. The treaty established the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization that serves the Alliance.  
During the Cold War, the Alliance’s main concern was defense of its members’ 
territories against the threat or coercion of the Communist Block. Obviously, any 
operations beyond NATO’s territory, the so-called “out-of-area”4 [Ref.28] were remote. 
Under these circumstances, conflict resolution or crisis management for NATO at that 
time were applied mainly to NATO’s Article V mission of collective defense. The 
Alliance’s main military mission was preparedness for deterrence and defense in case of 
aggression against the Alliance.  
As it succeeded in securing peace in Europe, NATO was viewed as a source of 
stability and security for Europe throughout the Cold War.  
 
2. NATO Today. 
 
In the early 1990s, the political transformation of the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
and the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact (1991) marked the end of the Cold 
War era. Not only have these events transformed the political situation in Europe, but 
                                                 
4 Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes the area of operation for NATO. 
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they have also radically reduced the military threat from Russia. Considering these 
circumstances, the question of the need for continuation of the Alliance was raised.  
Although the nature of the risks faced by the members of the Alliance has 
fundamentally changed, menaces to peace and stability have, as events have proven, still 
remained. As earlier noted, the Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of 
safeguarding the security of its members and establishing an enduring peace in Europe 
via both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of 
the Alliance’s security policy. In the new security environment, the chances of achieving 
these objectives by political means, as well as taking into account the economic, social 
and environmental dimensions of security and stability, are better than ever before. 
NATO has devoted much of its efforts in this decade to seek ways of justifying its 
continuation, and in identifying new strategic concepts and missions. Created to defend 
peace, NATO has attempted to transform itself into an organization committed to 
promoting peace, after the Cold War. NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in 
1991 [Ref.29] outlines a broad approach to security and integrates political and military 
elements of the Alliance’s security policy. This approach creates a coherent total,  
establishing cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe as an integral 
part of the Alliance’s strategy. Hence, NATO’s new agenda comprises the security and 





B. NATO'S ROLE  IN CONFLICTS. 
 
Post-Cold War Europe has been buffeted by nationalist passions unleashed in 
South Eastern Europe. Against the background of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 
attention has been directed increasingly towards possible NATO support for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping activities and 
its contributions to the United Nations (UN), OSCE and European Union (EU) 
negotiation efforts. As a result, as the Alliance actively pursues its commitment to 
achieve an effective collective defense capability and increase the institutional basis for 
crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution, NATO has new objectives that 
aim at: reducing the risk of conflict, building increased mutual understanding and 
confidence among all European states, helping to manage crises affecting the security of 
the Allies, and expanding the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European 
countries in dealing with common security problems. Examples of these new roles are in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
NATO’s involvement in the Bosnia and Kosovo wars signaled a shift in NATO’s 
missions in a post-Soviet Europe. These actions were carried out outside of NATO’s area 
of operations without directly serving to protect a NATO country from an aggressor. 
NATO’s actions during these wars were directed against the Yugoslav Government and 
security forces, pursuing brutal acts of ethnic cleansing, and not directed against the 
Serbian people.  
NATO also participated in the mediation processes, because its policy during the 
conflicts was to work for a country in which all ethnic groups are allowed to live in peace 
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and security. NATO wanted to demonstrate that ethnic cleansing - mass deportation, 
mass killings, and mass terror - have no place in the Europe of the 21st century. It also 
supported the work of the humanitarian organizations in relieving the suffering of the 
refugees by coordinating the airlift and storage of relief supplies, building shelters and 




a. Characteristics of the Conflict. 
 
As in all conflicts involving ethnicity, religion, national aspirations, and 
economics, there is no single cause of the Bosnia conflict. Considering the resource 
frame, the interest frame, and the identity frame, [Ref.30] the conflict in Bosnia 
represents a mix of interethnic conflicts and genocide. It is interethnic because actors 
pursued particular collective interests, such as chauvinism, nationalism, along with 
economic aspects. It is genocide because mass murder and crimes against humanity were 
organized by the state, illustrating the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals 
belonging to a particular national, ethnic, or religious group. Targets and victims have 





b. History of the Conflict. 
 
Yugoslavia was created after World War I, and comprised the following 
regions: Slovenia and Croatia (Catholic), Serbia (Orthodox), Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Muslim and Orthodox), and Vojvodina (Catholic). After 
World War II, it was divided into 6 republics and 2 provinces with a collective, Federal 
Presidency. Each republic and province had a president and representation in a Federal 
Assembly. This fragmented history meant that traditional symbols, legends, and heroes - 
memories that help bind most nations together - have tended to pull the people living in 
Yugoslavia in different directions. Strains within Yugoslavia’s federal system emerged 
after Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980.  
Before its independence, Bosnia had approximately four million 
inhabitants. Of these, three ethnic groups predominated: Slavic Muslims (forming 44 
percent of the population), Serbs (31 percent), and Croats (17 percent). At that time, a 
power vacuum developed in which separatist tens ions quickly mounted throughout the 
1980s. The 1990 elections in Bosnia resulted in a governing coalition corresponding to 
the three major ethnic groups. Muslims and Croats in the governing coalition favored 
independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was rejected by most Bosnian Serbs.  
In 1992, The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) broke up 
and wars started in the former republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 
January 1992, nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders proclaimed a Serbian entity within 
Bosnia. In an ensuing referendum, over 63 percent of Bosnians chose independence. 
Therefore, the criteria for recognition previously set forth by the US and the EU, were 
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met. Despite the Bosnian Serb party’s boycotting the vote and "encouraging" the Bosnian 
Serb community to follow suit, many Serbs supported the elected government. However, 
almost immediately, the Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav 
army, began forcible resistance to Bosnia’s independence. By the end of Spring 1992, 
Bosnian Serbs, who had significant military superiority, achieved control over more than 
60 percent of Bosnia’s territory. The US, along with most of the international community, 
recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. Bosnia, together with 
Croatia and Slovenia was admitted to the UN in May.  
The Serbian forces were supplied and supported by Slobodan Milosevic 
[Ref.31], a nationalist Serb who became president of the Communist Party in 1986, and 
Serb president in 1989, after removing Ivan Stambolic from the Serb presidency. 
Supporting the Serbian forces was part of Milosevic regime’s efforts to create a Greater 
Serbia. By early May, the Yugoslav Army announced that it would withdraw from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reality, however, thousands of Bosnian Serbs simply changed 
uniforms and continued prosecuting the war and genocide. In response to this, the UN 
Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia at the end of May 1992.  
 
c. NATO’s  Involvement in the Conflict . 
 
The international arena, including NATO, decided to take part in these 
events in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict. In this context, several negotiation 
efforts including the Vance-Owen [Ref.32] peace plan that would have divided Bosnia 
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into ten, rather than three, cantons, failed, largely because of the Serbs’s refusal to 
concede any territory (70 percent of Bosnia was under Serbian control by 1994).  
During the Summer of 1992, as the human rights and humanitarian crisis 
intensified, the Security Council voted to send UN peacekeepers to Bosnia to facilitate 
delivery of humanitarian relief. This mandate was later extended to the protection of a 
number of UN-declared "safe areas." To help assure the safety of humanitarian 
operations, the UN imposed a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia in October. In April 1993, 
NATO began to enforce the “no-fly zone.” In early 1994, with UN-EU efforts bogged 
down, the United States decided to undertake more active involvement, seeking to back 
diplomacy with the threat of NATO air power to protect safe areas and UN peacekeepers. 
The UN’s failure in maintaining the “safe areas” justified the Clinton administration’s 
decision to circumvent the UN and OSCE, in favor of NATO. NATO agreed in July to 
use air power to protect UN forces if attacked and, in August, declared its readiness to 
respond with air strikes. [Ref.33]  
NATO/US initiated aggressive efforts to bring the war to an end in the 
Summer of 1995, when the tide began to turn against the Serbs, and as Muslim-Croat 
forces recaptured some of the Serb-held territory in Bosnia. In reaction to a Bosnian Serb 
rocket attack that killed many civilians in a Sarajevo marketplace, NATO carried out its 
threat to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. On August 30th 1995, NATO forces launched air 
strikes on Serb targets, thus commencing Operation Deliberate Force, the largest NATO 
military action up until that time. [Ref.34] NATO’s aim was primarily to ease the siege of 
Sarajevo and induce the Bosnian Serbs to agree to negotiate. Accordingly, the strikes 
were directed at a small number of targets that, if destroyed, would not adversely affect 
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the Serbs’ ability to hold territory. The strikes decreased the Bosnian Serbs’ ability to 
command and control their troops.  
Despite a bombing suspension on September 1st, the Serb military refused 
to comply with a NATO ultimatum to remove all heavy weapons from a 12-mile 
exclusion zone around Sarajevo, stop attacks on Sarajevo or other “safe areas”, and allow 
complete freedom of movement for UN forces and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) (including unrestricted use of the Sarajevo airport). NATO thus resumed 
bombing on September 5th.  
Due to the military defeats on the ground and NATO bombing from 
above, the attacks by Bosnian Serbs were halted. The Bosnian Serbs were brought to the 
negotiating table at the auditorium of a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, on November 
21st, 1995. The presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina gathered with 
representatives from the Contact Group (comprising NATO countries - such as US, 
France, Britain, Germany - and Russia) in Dayton to initiate a peace agreement ending 
the war in Bosnia. The road to the Dayton accord was a long and difficult one. It was 
paved by NATO bombardment, the successful negotiations in Geneva and New York 
[Ref.35] that cemented the basic principles of the final settlement, and the three-week 
talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force base that finally produced agreement.  
NATO/US negotiated directly with Milosevic to reach a solution to the 
Bosnian war and authorized Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. At the 
meetings in Geneva (September 8th, 1995) and New York (September 26th, 1995), the 
Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (also representing the Bosnian Serbs) 
agreed to basic principles for a settlement in Bosnia: the preservation of Bosnia as a 
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single state; an equitable division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a 
Bosnian Serb entity based on the Contact Group’s 51/49 formula; constitutional 
structures; free and fair elections; and respect for human rights.  
In Dayton, the Bosnian Serb leadership was ready to settle and comply 
with NATO’s conditions. These negotiations were called "proximity peace talks," 
[Ref.36] because significant territorial issues had to be resolved in Dayton. Maps were a 
significant part of the currency of negotiation.  
The Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia were designed to 
guarantee a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to lay the foundations for a 
reintegration of the country’s divided ethnic communities. Formalized in Paris on 
December 14th, the Dayton Accords consisted of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and eleven annexes, setting forth obligations of the 
parties and the international community to implement the agreement. They called for a 
federalized Bosnia in which 51 percent of the land would constitute the Croatian-Bosnian 
federation and 49 percent would constitute the Serb Republic.  
The Dayton Accords also included provisions that gradually increased the 
scope of the central institutions. Hence, the functions of the commissions on human 
rights, displaced people and refugees, and the preservation of national monuments would 
transfer to Bosnia’s central government five years after the signing of the Dayton 
Accords (unless the parties agreed otherwise). This would give the central institutions 
substantial authority over human rights and the return of people in both entities to their 
homes. To enforce the agreement a new 60,000-member international force was 
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deployed. Therefore, the Dayton Accords represented both a territorial and a political 
compromise.  
Federal and regional elections in September 1996 produced a tripartite 
national presidency. The federal legislature, with seats apportioned to each ethnic group, 
was dominated by nationalist parties. It was estimated that by the end of 1994 at least 




a. Characteristics of the Conflict. 
 
Like the Bosnian conflict, the Kosovo conflict has multiple roots, and 
represents a mix of interethnic conflict and genocide. "The root cause of conflict in 
Kosovo is two-pronged." [Ref.37] On one level, conflict was generated by power 
struggles among elites (states or quasi-states), or by exacerbated nationalism of certain 
leaders. On another level, it was the result of historically-conflicting national identities, 
human development needs, misunderstandings among the general populace, and a culture 
of failing to accept responsibility for social problems. In their struggle for power, 
political elites exploited the already existing disturbances in the general populace and, 
when desirable and feasible, they created new ones.  
The turbulences also had their roots in the differing national identities of 
the two groups, defined in opposition to each other. In this context, Serbs consider 
themselves cultured in contrast with the primitive Albanians; whereas, the Kosovar 
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Albanians see themselves as peaceful compared to the aggressive Serbs. Serbian 
nationalism stemmed from victimization, the need to struggle and defend the motherland, 
and the Orthodox purity against other primitive religions. [Ref.38] On the other hand, 
Kosovar Albanians’ nationalism stemmed from the victimization at the hands of Serbs. 
[Ref.39] 
With regard to the second level, the conflict resulted from the way the two 
oppositional national identities play out in everyday life. In the Kosovo case, the very 
identities of Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are "under attack," [Ref.40] and they do not 
understand each other’s needs and desires. 
In addition, political elites deliberately perpetuated and exploited conflict 
between the population, so that social-economic institutions and structures that perpetuate 
poverty continued to ensure that human development needs remain unmet. Moreover, 
Serbian-run institutions in Kosovo played a tremendous role in increasing violence 
between Albanians and Serbs in this region.  
 
b. History of the Conflict. 
 
Following the death of Tito who granted autonomy to Vojvodina and 
Kosovo in 1974 (fact that angered the Serbs), the decline of Yugoslavia started. Hence, in 
1980, the predominantly Albanian population of Kosovo commenced demonstrations 
aimed at forcing the Yugoslav Government to recognize the province as a federal 
republic on an equal basis with the six existing republics. In the Spring of 1981, acts of 
civil disorder and economic sabotage, led largely by students at the University of Pristina, 
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the capital of Kosovo, escalated. The demonstrators publicly proclaimed issues of 
discrimination and freedom as the bases of discontent. As a result, the national 
government sealed off Kosovo, sent in the militia to restore order, and closed educational 
institutions. Virtual occupation of the region by the Yugoslav People’s Army followed.  
Milosevic used Serbian nationalism and resentment of the Kosovo 
Albanians as a springboard to national power. For the Milosevic’s regime, Kosovo was 
more than a dispute over land. It represented the image of Serbianity that Serbs must 
protect. At a Communist Party meeting in Kosovo Polje in April 1987, Milosevic told 
Serbs, "No one should dare to beat you." [Ref.41] For this position, he became a popular 
hero to Serbs in Kosovo. After that meeting he was determined to reverse the 
Albanianization of Kosovo, seeing it as a path to supreme power in Serbia. As a result, in 
1989, he abrogated Kosovo’s constitutional autonomy, concurrently launching a purge of 
ethnic Albanians from the province’s civil service and curtailing government funding for 
public institutions, including the schools.  
Serbia also dissolved the Kosovo assembly. What the Milosevic regime 
wanted was a much tighter Yugoslav federation, controlled by Belgrade. Viewed by 
Serbians as the cradle of their nation, the maintenance of Kosovo as part of Serbia 
became a cornerstone by the appeals of the nationalists and ultranationalists that 
dominated Serbia’s politics following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In response to 
Belgrade, the Kosovars, led by Ibrahim Rugova, set up a shadow government 
(Democratic League of Kosovo), and began a campaign of non-violent resistance to the 
Serbian oppression. The political leadership of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo 
sought greater independence and freedom from Serb authorities since the early 1990s, but 
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Serbia (impartially) rejected the idea. The peaceful [Ref.42] mass demonstrations 
provoked by the abolishment of the Kosovo Constitution in 1989, were overcome by 
Serbian security forces.  
Pressured by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, the Kosovo 
Assembly abolished the province's autonomous status. Legislation was passed that denied 
ownership and work to Kosovo-Albanians. As a result, in 1991, tens of thousands of 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo lost their jobs, and the Albanian cultural institutions in 
Kosovo were suppressed by Serbia. Consequently, the Republic of Kosovo was created in 
a secret referendum in 1991. It was recognized only by Albania’s Parliament.  
In defiance of the Serbian authorities, ethnic Albanians elected writer 
Ibrahim Rugova as president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and set up a 
provincial assembly. Serbia declared the election to be illegal, and the Kosovo Albanians 
began non-violent resistance to the oppressive rule from Belgrade. In 1996 the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) appeared on the scene, claiming responsibility for a number of 
bombings and attacks against Serbian police and state officials. In 1997, the KLA 
claimed responsibility for a further series of violent incidents, including bombings, 
attacks on police stations, and raids on refugee camps. Serb police crushed Albanian 
student demonstrations in October. In 1998, the friction increased visibly. In February-
March, Serbian police conducted a series of raids in the Drenica region of Kosovo, 





c. NATO’s Involvement in the Conflict. 
 
As it was in the case of Bosnian conflict, the international arena including 
NATO wanted to halt the escalation of conflict and bring the parties to the negotiation 
table. Many activities were held at the international level, i.e. between each side in the 
conflict and foreign representatives, ambassadors, envoys, as well as within international 
organizations (in the UN, OSCE, NATO) and the Contact Group. However, the Albanian 
side did not respond to the series of invitations for negotiations with the Serbian side. 
Instead they insisted that they were only prepared to discuss independence and demanded 
an outside mediator.  
On the other hand, the Serbian side rejected the second condition, using 
as an excuse the results of a referendum held in Spring 1998 in which a great majority of 
the participants – fearing influence coming from an unfavorable international community 
– refuse the participation of foreign representatives in negotiations on Kosovo. Both sides 
viewed negotiation as a betrayal. The KLA’s negative attitude towards negotiation, the 
threats to those leaders of Albanian political parties who would sign any agreement 
except the one on Kosovo’s independence, as well as the Serbian side’s refusal to 
negotiate with representatives of KLA, resulted in only a couple of contacts between the 
two sides.  
The UN Security Council approved (with China abstaining) Resolution 
1199, on September 23rd, 1998, which demanded a cessation of hostilities and warned 
that additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region would be 
considered if the measures demanded in this resolution were not taken. The next day, 
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NATO took the first formal steps toward military intervention in Kosovo, approving two 
contingency operation plans - one for air strikes and the second for monitoring and 
maintaining a cease-fire agreement - if one was reached.  
On October 8th,  the Contact Group reiterated the six UN demands to 
Milosevic: an end to Serb offensives in Kosovo, withdrawal of Serb forces, freedom of 
access and full cooperation with the International War Crimes tribunal, safe return of 
refugees to their homes, and a start to a negotiated solution to the crisis.  
The US sent its diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, to Belgrade to continue 
searching for a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the conflict, on the one hand, and to 
identify a potential way for political dialogue to take place between Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians. Subsequently, NATO Secretary General signed an agreement in Belgrade for 
NATO forces to carry out the air verification regime to oversee Serbia’s compliance with 
UN Resolution 1199, while OSCE President signed an agreement that called for 2,000 
members of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to move in.  
On October 12th, Milosevic made key concessions to Holbrooke and 
agreed to comply with UN demands. He agreed to allow the above mentioned 2,000-
member OSCE observer force to enter Kosovo and NATO to fly reconnaissance missions 
over Kosovo. On  October 13th, NATO approved an activation order (ACTORD), 
reiterated on January 30th, 1999, placing authority for air strikes in the hands of the 
Secretary General, saying that execution would begin in approximately 96 hours. 
However, implementation was delayed until October 17th to allow Milosevic to sign 
implementation accords.  
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On October 15th, Milosevic gave permission for NATO reconnaissance 
flights to begin, and on October 16th, he agreed to allow the OSCE KVM force to enter 
Kosovo. On October 17th, NATO again extended its deadline to October 27th to give 
Milosevic time to withdraw troops and allow the OSCE to assess compliance with UNSC 
resolutions.  
Nonetheless, it appeared that not all forces were being withdrawn and 
some new units were being sent into Kosovo. The Supreme Allied Commander 
(SACEUR), and NATO Military Committee Chairman visited Belgrade on October 24th 
and warned Milosevic that NATO would launch air strikes unless forces were withdrawn 
by October 27th. NATO suspended the threat though, as it appeared that Milosevic was 
withdrawing his forces. However, NATO said it would keep its forces in a high state of 
alert.  
Before the deadline expired, on October 27th, 4,000 special police troops 
went to Pristina, thus bringing Serbia into compliance with the terms of the agreements it 
had reached. Fighting nevertheless continued in Kosovo, despite the beginning of the 
deployment of the KVM on November 6th. An extraction force of 1,800 troops was to be 
deployed in Macedonia to extract the KVM if they were threatened. On November 15th, 
the Serb president agreed to a discussion with Kosovar Albanian leaders, who rejected it.  
The US envoy continued to move the peace plan forward. The plan, 
presented by the envoy in September, envisaged autonomy for Kosovo. His peace deal 
was redrafted on November 18th, but was stalled because of renewed violence. The US 
envoy’s failure to involve the KLA was considered to be a major stumbling block.  
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Fighting intensified in December in Kosovo between Serb forces and the 
KLA, ending with a local truce which was agreed upon on December 27th. On December 
7th, both the Albanian and Serb Kosovars rejected a new NATO/US draft for a peace 
plan. On December 29th, the NATO Secretary General warned all parties to maintain 
peace or face the threat of force.  
The conflict escalated in 1999. A massacre of Albanian civilians was 
reported in Kosovo, and Yugoslavia accused Albania of aiding terrorists. Tirana reported 
an increase in the number of firings by Yugoslav forces into Albania. Belgrade also 
became increasingly hostile to the OSCE KVM. On January 29th, the Contact Group met 
in London and gave Serbs and ethnic Albanians an ultimatum to attend peace talks in 
France starting February 6th5. Both political leaders in Kosovo and a KLA spokesman 
announced their participation in the proposed peace talks.  
Talks began in Chateau Rambouillet (France) on February 6th, under the 
auspices of the Contact Group and the co-chairmanship of French and British Foreign 
Ministers, as well as in the presence of three co-mediators representing NATO/US, the 
European Union, and the Russian Federation. After heated deliberations, the Serbs 
refused to allow NATO ground forces in Kosovo and left without signing an agreement. 
After a further extension of the deadline for 3 days, the talks stopped on February 23rd. 
The ethnic Albanians agreed in principle to signing the entire accord, but requested time 
to consult with Kosovar Albanians at home. Both sides agreed to meet again in France on 
March 15th for further negotiations. When both sides met again in Paris in March, the 
                                                 
5 The talks were to last one week, with the possibility of an extension to a second week if progress 
would be made.  
 42
Serbs no longer supported even the political portion of the proposal. Only the Albanian 
delegation signed the agreement.  
The aim of the Rambouillet talks was to reach an agreement on substantial 
autonomy for Kosovo, while respecting the national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The plan of the Rambouillet Agreement deals 
with government structure, territorial status, communes, assemblies, competences, 
presidential matters, administration, courts, ombudsman, human rights, councils, 
monitoring, police and security, extradition of war criminals, law enforcement, crowd 
and traffic control, police operations, border security, arrest and detention, and elections.  
For the Kosovo Albanians, it stipulates that they immediately have total 
control over the province. The only sacrifice required of them is to wait three years 
before the arrangements are made legally permanent. For the Serbs, the Rambouillet 
agreement stipulates that immediately upon signing they lose all sovereignty over 
Kosovo. Total political control would belong to the Albanians and the NATO Civilian 
Implementation Mission. In addition,  Yugoslav laws would no longer apply in Kosovo, 
nor would Yugoslavia be able to exercise police powers in Kosovo. After three years, 
these arrangements would be made permanent by the will of the people of Kosovo, who 
are mainly Albanians.  
The Yugoslavian delegation at Rambouillet agreed to give the Albanians 
autonomy in Kosovo (including religious, education, health care systems, and local 
government operations). However, it tried to negotiate on preserving the right of the 
Yugoslav federal government to determine economic and foreign policy, on maintaining 
Yugoslav national law in Kosovo, and on limiting international presence in Kosovo to 
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observation and advice, not control. The Serbian negotiating efforts were rejected, and 
the Serbs were told they had only two choices: sign the agreement as written, or face 
NATO bombing. 
The day after the Paris peace talks were suspended, Yugoslav armed units 
launched an offensive, driving thousands of ethnic Albanians out of their homes and 
villages, executing some, displacing many others, and setting fire to many houses. One 
last diplomatic effort was made by the international community on March 21st, 1999, by 
sending the US envoy to Belgrade to deliver a final warning to Milosevic, however no 
concessions came. Milosevic’s stubbornness ultimately forced NATO to take military 
action. 
On March 19th, the OSCE KVM were withdrawn, and on March 24th, the 
NATO Secretary General authorized Operation Allied Force to compel Belgrade to allow 
an implementation force into Kosovo. NATO airstrikes began at 1900 hours GMT on 
March 24th, 1999, and the Yugoslav government declared a state of war in Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslav leadership responded to the NATO airstrikes by intensifying the ethnic 
cleansing process and driving a large proportion of the Kosovar Albanian population out 
of the province into Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. Belgrade appeared to be 
aiming at the complete removal of the Albanian population of Kosovo.  
Although the primary justification for NATO actions against Yugoslavia 
was its refusal to sign the Kosovo peace agreement put forward at Rambouillet, there 
were two main reasons for the Alliance’s intervention in Kosovo: humanitarian reasons 
and NATO’s interest in the region (lasting peace, democracy, and stability.) NATO 
began its bombing campaign with three key demands: NATO troops be granted control 
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over the province of Kosovo, Yugoslav forces be withdrawn, and substantial autonomy 
be granted to the Kosovo Albanians pending a referendum to decide the province’s fate 
after three years. When the intensive bombing - and the vengeful, criminal actions of 
Serb forces - led to the mass migration of Kosovar Albanians, a fourth demand was 
added: the refugees be allowed to return to their homes. Thus, after repeated attempts to 
reach a diplomatic solution failed, the NATO airstrikes were intended to prevent an 
imminent catastrophe. 
On June 3rd, 1999, President Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted peace 
terms presented by the international arena. With the authorization of the United Nations, 
NATO and Russian forces deployed into Kosovo to begin the task of restoring peace to 
the province. Thus, on June 20th, Operation Allied Force was officially terminated as all 
Serbian and Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo. The province was subsequently 
divided into peacekeeping zones where NATO troops are currently deployed enforcing 
law and the restoration of the area’s infrastructure.  
Kosovo Force (KFOR), with NATO at its core, is establishing a secure 
environment for the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Albanian and 
Serb. KFOR provides the general conditions of security to allow the UN, the OSCE, the 
EU and other international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations 
to carry out their tasks of reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and re-establishment of 





IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
AND KOSOVO 
 
NATO is one of the third parties that took part in conflict management in the 
former Yugoslavia, acting both militarily and diplomatically. After the wars ended in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has taken part in the efforts to implement the Dayton 
Agreement and Kosovo peace plan, and to support political reconstruction.  
The North Atlantic Alliance has the potential to contribute to international peace 
and humanitarian operations with a wide spectrum of assets and capabilities [Ref.43]:  
ü NATO has common procedures, effective command and control systems, 
effective logistics systems and capabilities, substantial transportation means, 
extensive modern infrastructure.  
ü NATO has strategic resources and unique capabilities to deal with conflict. 
ü NATO has well- trained modern and interoperable military forces. Its various 
military forces posses a scale and degree of readiness not available elsewhere. 
ü NATO has multidimensional planning capability. 
ü NATO has the capability to develop and contribute an essential core political 
consensus on difficult issues.  
This chapter analyzes whether or not NATO, given its assets and capabilities, 
complies with the terms of an “ideal third party” taking part in conflicts, based on the 




Table 1. Criteria for an "Ideal Third Party" 
 
NO. 
CRITERIA FOR AN 
IDEAL THIRD PARTY 
INTERVENING IN A 
CONFLICT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Plans in advance. 
A potent third party plans its mediation development 
in advance, assuming that it would be helpful during conflict 




In general, most successful negotiators start off 
assuming collaborative (integrative) or “win-win”-type 
negotiation, because negotiations tend to go much better if 
conflicting parties perceive they are in a “win-win” situation 
or both sides approach the negotiation wanting to satisfy both 
their own needs and the other’s needs. 
3. Remains neutral. 
In general, successful resolution of a conflict occurs 
when the third party remains neutral/unbiased. Thus, the third 
part acts as a catalyst within the conflict, without taking sides 
or imposing a solution on the parties, makes a decision for the 
parties, or gives them any legal advice. 
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Table 1. Criteria for an "Ideal Third Party" 
 
NO. 
CRITERIA FOR AN 
IDEAL THIRD PARTY 




Acts as communicator, 
formulator, or 
manipulator, helping the 
parties to solve the 
conflict, if required. 
In the case of conflict where direct contact between 
parties is impossible, the mediator can serve as a 
communicator, acting as a conduit, opening contacts, and 
carrying messages in order to avoid parties’ talking to one 
another and helping parties make concessions without 
appearing weak or losing face. In other situations, when 
conflict may prevent parties from conceiving ways out of the 
dispute, mediation requires a mediator to be a formulator who 
persuades the sides or suggests solutions to their discord. 
Moreover, if there are situations when reaching an agreement 
is hindered by the apparently minor size of the outcome, the 
negotiation/mediation process requires the mediator to act as a 
manipulator, persuading the parties of its point(s) of view with 
regard to the solution. 
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Table 1. Criteria for an "Ideal Third Party" 
 
NO. 
CRITERIA FOR AN 
IDEAL THIRD PARTY 




Does not seek quick-fix 
solutions. 
However urgent the necessity to resolve a particular 
conflict, the third party does not seek quick-fix solutions or 
attempts to rush the mediation process. The third party has to 
take the cares and worries of a party seriously. 
6. 
Senses what variant to 
use, if uses coercive or 
deterrent means.  
When the nature of conflict demands the third party to 
use coercion and deterrent means, this party must know very 
well what to demand of the opponents, and whether and how 
to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand, 
without imposing an ultimatum. An ideal third party must 
have the ability to sense what variant of the coercive 
diplomacy strategy is the best to make use of during 
intervention in conflict. The third party should not have to 
expect the adversary to behave, or react in a certain way, 
based on its calculations or speculations. 
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Table 1. Criteria for an "Ideal Third Party" 
 
NO. 
CRITERIA FOR AN 
IDEAL THIRD PARTY 




Establishes the rewards 
and threats ("carrots-and-
sticks") credible, if uses 
coercive or deterrent 
means. 
When the nature of conflict demands the third party to 
use coercion and deterrent means, it must also know the 
suitable nature and size of punishment, as well as, how to 
utilize the “carrot-and-stick” approach. If the threat of 
punishment is coupled with positive inducements to 
encourage the adversary to comply with the demand, both 
threats of punishment and rewards have to be seriously taken 
into account by the other parties involved in the conflict. 
 
 
A. IS NATO AN “IDEAL THIRD PARTY” INTERVENING IN A 
CONFLICT?    
 
According to Table 1, an ideal third party should have a plan established prior to 
any course of action; it should approach a "win-win" strategy to satisfy both its interest(s) 
and those of the opposing sides; it should remain neutral, acting as a catalyst within the 
conflict; it should act as a communicator, formulator, or manipulator, to assist the parties 
to settle their differences when the conflict requires; it should not seek quick-fix solutions 
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or attempt to rush the mediation process, no matter the circumstances, while taking the 
concerns of each party seriously; and it should sense what variant to use, if coercive or 
deterrent means are used, making its rewards and threats ("carrots-and-sticks") credible. 
A third party intervening in conflict resolution should be extremely adroit in fulfilling all 
seven criteria in the table to be qualified as "ideal"; failing to fulfill any of the seven 
criteria means that the party is not an "ideal" one.  
This chapter addresses the question of Bosnia first, and then examines the 
situation in Kosovo. Every criterion in Table 1, along with the factors affecting NATO’s 




With regard to the first criterion in Table 1, NATO and the international arena  
attempting to manage the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not plan the negotiations in 
advance and, therefore, lacked "clear policy objectives." [Ref.44] They were uncertain 
about the future of the region. Up until 1991 they tried to persuade the Yugoslav 
republics to remain together [Ref.45], and only after this they started encouraging the 
splitting of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In this case, NATO and the international 
arena lacked a clearly-defined plan, established in advance, of their courses of action.  
With regard to the second criterion in Table 1, successful conflict resolution and 
management techniques/measures cannot be carried out through imposition, without 
cooperation from the parties involved. “Win-win”- type negotiations are preferable to 
“win- lose” ones, in order to effectively solve conflicts. During the negotiations in the 
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Bosnian conflict, NATO succeeded in approaching “win-win”-type negotiations, aiming 
to make both parties feel like they would win. During the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian 
Serbs received 49 percent of the original Bosnia-Herzogovina, while a Federation of the 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats received 51 percent. The division allowed 
contiguous areas, without divisions, as well as access to the sea for both entities.  
Concerning the third criterion in Table 1, Bosnia case confirms that there was 
truly no impartial intervention by the West. Although the Bosnian Serbs “were 
completely ignored” (since the NATO/US negotiators discussed only with Milosevic), 
[Ref.46] they were forced to accept the Dayton Accords. The Dayton Accords thus 
illustrate that NATO/US did not play the role of an unbiased mediator while attempting 
to solve the conflicts.  
In respect to the fourth criterion in Table 1, when contact between parties was 
impossible during the Bosnian conflict, NATO served as a communicator or formulator 
in its diplomatic attempts. It transmitted opinions and facts from and to the opposing 
sides, or tried to suggest solutions for the differences of the disputing sides. According to 
Noel Malcolm, the main activity of the West was "diplomacy, negotiation, and 







The conference in London in 1992, where the parties in the Bosnian conflict were 
invited to settle their differences, and the Holbrooke team's round of shuttle diplomacy in 
1995, which took them to 31 countries in 15 days,6 are a few examples of such activities 
of the West. Milosevic was persuaded by NATO/US that he would have to lead 
negotiations on behalf of the Republika Srpska, whose leaders had already been indicted 
for war crimes. In agreeing to attend a meeting of the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia), Bosnia, and Croatia, Milosevic de facto acknowledged that Bosnia would 
remain a single country with its current, internationally-recognized borders. At the 
Geneva foreign ministers’ summit in September 1995, the Serbs formally agreed to the 
continued existence of Bosnia as a country, in which 51 percent of its territory would be 
controlled by the Muslim-Croat federation and the rest by the Serbs. NATO would send 
in a massive force to keep the peace and begin rebuilding the country.  
With regard to the fifth criterion, avoiding quick-fix solutions, NATO/US and 
other members of the Contact Group, who wished to avoid any additional complications 
of the already highly delicate negotiations with Milosevic, in Dayton, embraced quick-fix 
solutions. In this sense, the issue of Kosovo was avoided during the proximity talks, on 
the premise that some settlement is better than no settlement at all and continued warfare. 




                                                 
6 Including places like Belgrade (three times), Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, Zagreb, Athens, Skopje, 
and Ankara. 
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Concerning the sixth criterion in Table 1, the violent conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina demanded NATO and the other international organizations to use coercive 
means in addit ion to negotiation. NATO's coercive diplomacy succeeded in Bosnia. In 
February 1993, when NATO/US decided to take a more assertive role in the Bosnian 
crisis, it implicitly used the “try-and-see7” [Ref.48] variant of coercive diplomacy. Thus, 
NATO/US requests that the Bosnian combatants guarantee humanitarian access to the 
villages and accept the territorial settlement framed in the United Nations/European 
Community peace plan were backed with allusions to a possible use of airpower and 
tougher economic sanctions. In this context, NATO/US (through the efforts of Holbrooke 
and his colleagues) used a combination of force and diplomacy to bring the Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs to the bargaining table. The attack on the central market of Sarajevo 
convinced the West that only a strong show of force would bring Milosevic, if not the 
Bosnian Serbs, to the table. Stopping the war in Bosnia and achieving the Dayton 
Accords in the autumn of 1995, were the result of NATO’s military force and firm 
leadership. In addition, the Dayton Accords represented a “largely imposed” [Ref.49] 
solution to the Bosnian conflict, rather than a solution reached by the parties. 
Regarding the seventh criterion in Table 1, NATO’s threat and the use of force 
were credible and instrumental for achieving diplomatic ends in the Bosnian conflict. For 
that reason, "the sustained NATO bombing campaign had fundamentally transformed the 
strategic landscape in Bosnia" [Ref.50] and Milosevic, who was reluctant to negotiations 
in the beginning, was eager to negotiate.  
 
                                                 




As concerns the first criterion in Table 1, NATO did not plan its strategy, or goals 
of negotiation, or what the future of Serbia and Kosovo should look like, in advance. 
Only after the bombing campaign on August 30th, 1995, did NATO develop a plan. The 
plan clearly stated: “Serbs out, NATO in, and refugees back.” [Ref.51]  
With regard to the second criterion in Table 1, there were circumstances when 
NATO attempted to approach “win-win”-type negotiations in the Kosovo conflict, 
aiming to make both parties feel like they could win, yet trying to remain neutral or 
impartial. However, the negotiations ended in a "win- lose" situation, for instance, the 
Rambouillet Agreement, which provided a full- fledged autonomy of Kosovo, backed by 
the full faith and credit of NATO, including 4,000 American troops on indefinite loan. 
This did not please the Serbs, which is why they did not want to sign it. However, by 
signing the Western-backed peace plan for Kosovo, on June 3rd, 1999, the Yugoslavian 
government accepted the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb forces from the province, and 
the international peacekeeping force which was to facilitate the return of refugees. The 
peace plan for Kosovo shattered the Kosovo Liberation Army's goal of independence for 
Kosovo.  
In regard to the third criterion in Table 1, during the Kosovo conflict NATO/US 
was neutral. The Rambouillet Agreement confirms that NATO/US played the role of an 
impartial mediator while attempting to solve the conflict. Thus, while the main threat 
issued by NATO before Rambouillet directly concerned the Serbs, before and during the 
 55
negotiations, the Kosovars were also told that their refusal to sign the accords would stop 
support from NATO. [Ref.52]   
Concerning the fourth criterion in Table 1, due to the sometimes impossible direct 
contact between parties, NATO served as a communicator, transmitting opinions and 
facts, from and to the opposing sides; or as a formulator, trying to persuade the disputing 
sides and to suggest solutions for their differences. In this context, NATO, along with the 
Contact Group, opened contacts and carried messages, trying to persuade the parties of 
their point(s) of view; in other words, it acted as a conduit trying to help the disputing 
parties make concessions without appearing weak. As a result, both the Kosovar Serbs 
and Albanians agreed to work toward an interim plan for Kosovo, which aimed at 
implementing autonomy in the short term, and delaying the political status of the 
province for three to five years. This was possible as NATO and other international 
organizations acted as communicators and formulators. Since the search for a diplomatic 
solution to the Kosovo conflict was a problem8, due to Milosevic's constant refusal for 
foreign mediation in any direct discussion with Kosovar Albanians, and Albanians' 
ceaseless disputes about who should be part of a negotiation team, little progress was 
initially made in persuading the two adversaries to accept to work toward an interim plan 
for Kosovo. Success came eventually, due to NATO and the other organizations' acting 
as communicators and formulators. However, the underlying conflict between the Serbs 
and Kosovar Albanians remained unsolved, and their positions continued to be 
diametrically opposed. 
                                                 
8 As both parties viewed the negotiation as a betrayal. 
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With regards to the fifth criterion in Table 1, NATO, along with the other 
international organizations did not seek quick-fix solutions to solve the conflict. NATO 
delayed the talks for two weeks, at the request of the parties involved in the conflict, in 
order to let them consider its demands. After the meeting on February 23rd, 1999, the 
discussions were suspended again until March, 15th. 
Concerning the sixth criterion in Table 1, NATO/US tried to use the ultimatum 
variant [Ref.53] of coercive diplomacy beside negotiation, in order to persuade Milosevic 
to sign on to a peace plan for the region.  
While coercive diplomacy was finally successful in Bosnia, it proved to fail 
initially in Kosovo. Although the Dayton Accords were possible due to NATO’s military 
intervention, the Rambouillet talks failed, and entailed the intervention by NATO. 
Although the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement on October 1998 was probably the last 
chance for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict, it represented only a temporary 
answer to an immediate humanitarian problem, containing the crisis without resolving it. 
As it focused on resolving the immediate humanitarian crisis, and offered no solutions to 
the underlying reasons for the conflict, Milosevic violated the provisions of the 
agreement. As a result, the US and its NATO allies’ coercive diplomacy failed.  
In spite of the fact that all parties agreed to meet at Rambouillet, France, to reach 
an agreement, in February 1999, Serbia refused to sign the agreements because of two 
core issues, both regarding the concept of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. First, Serbia 
would not agree to the withdrawal of all troops from Kosovo. Some troops, numbers 
unspecified, had to remain. Second, Serbia was not prepared to allow a heavily armed 
NATO force to occupy Kosovo. It was agreeing to a substantial NATO presence, but not 
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to an exclusive NATO presence or to de facto NATO control of the province. There were 
other issues, but none were as central as these two. NATO told the Serbs to take it or 
leave it. Serbia left it.  
Thus, the Rambouillet Accord’s general intent was to back a demand upon the 
adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance. It represented rather a 
declaration of war disguised as a peace agreement, therefore, the Serbian parliament 
seemed to have voted to be bombed. The Allies and the Contact Group set up the 
framework for the future of Kosovo’s approximately 1.5 million inhabitants and the rest 
of Yugoslavia, around 10 million people, without asking them how they would like their 
future to be. Since the proposals submitted did not reach agreement on an exchange or on 
the realization of a common interest, NATO’s coercion-based strategy, consequently, 
entailed the bombing campaign in Spring 1999.  
With regard to the seventh criterion in Table 1, while in the Bosnian conflict, 
NATO’s threat of force was credible and instrumental in achieving diplomatic ends, 
initially, the bombing campaign in Kosovo by NATO was not. It was treated in Belgrade 
as a simulation by NATO. Belgrade simply did no t believe it was real. Accordingly, the 
first reactions by the regime and the public were defiance and derision. Credibility was 
undermined, on the one hand, by the absence of a military strategy to prove how a 
clearly-established objective could be fulfilled via the use of force, and, on the other 
hand, by the absence of “follow-through on earlier threats of military action.” [Ref.54] 
However, NATO’s military campaign eventually succeeded, only after NATO had 
clearly defined its goals: withdrawal of the Serbian troops, NATO troops on the Serb 
territory, and return of refugees. Thus, in June, Milosevic finally agreed to withdraw the 
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Yugoslav army and Serbian police units from Kosovo. It took “eleven weeks of bombing 
near 40,000 aircraft sorties and the serious threat of ground invasion to bring home to him 
that NATO meant business.” [Ref.55] The agreement provided for 50,000 international 
troops under UN mandate with “significant” NATO participation (operating not solely 
under NATO control as in Rambouillet) to occupy Kosovo and guarantee a safe return of 
Albanian refugees. Unlike Rambouillet, the terms for peace did not include a referendum 
to determine the future of Kosovo, but instead guaranteed that Kosovo would have broad 
autonomy within Yugoslavia. 
NATO (and the other international institutions, such as UN, OSCE, the Contact 
Group) failed to intervene in an effective and constructive way to mediate a democratic 
and peaceful disassociation of former republics from the Yugoslav federation after its 
destruction by the arbitrary actions of Milosevic’s Serbian government and the Serbian-
dominated federal army leadership. Since NATO did not meet all seven criteria in the 
table, it cannot be viewed as an ideal third party intervening in a conflict. There are many 
factors that affect its being an ideal third party. NATO is more oriented toward coercive 
and deterrent approaches of dealing with conflicts, as it possesses a multitude of coercive 
capabilities and assets, than toward negotiating (mediation-based) ones. Nonetheless, far 
for making NATO an ideal third party, its interventions as a third party during the Bosnia 




B. WERE THE OUTCOMES OF NATO’S INTERVENTION IN THE TWO 











Agreements express a transformation in the content of 
conflict. They represent the cessation of the fight. 
2. 
Transformation in the course 
of conflict and change in 
relationships. 
Transformation reflects a better understanding of the 
nature of conflict itself. It entails changing the way conflict 
is expressed, as it results in removing the roots of conflict 
and stopping the current antagonisms either through 
reconciliation between opponents or the occurrence of a 
new conflict, more constructively conducted this time. 
Removing the roots of conflict and stopping the current 
antagonisms are, thus, successful outcomes. 
 
According to Table 2, outcomes of a successful negotiation and third-party 
intervention should consist of the following: agreements and conflict transformation. 
Thus, an ideal third party should be extremely resourceful in making the opposing sides 
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With regard to the first criterion for outcomes of successful negotiations and 
third-party interventions, as defined in Table 2, the negotiations at the American base in 
Dayton, Ohio, ended with the signing of a peace agreement. It reached a more lasting 
solution for Bosnia and the Serb-Croat conflict.  
Concerning the second criterion for outcomes of successful negotiations and 
third-party interventions, as defined in Table 2, a positive result of the negotiations was 
the contribution to relieving tensions and the reestablishment of stability in the region, 
without necessarily marking the end of the regional crisis. For this reason, while the 
Dayton Accords stopped the fighting, they did not include frameworks for ethnic 
reconciliation or multiethnic societies. In this context, the fact that Kosovo had not been 
included in the phase of intensive negotiations in Dayton, was probably due to the wish 
of NATO and the other international mediators. [Ref.56] They wanted to end the war in 
Bosnia as soon as possible and find a peaceful formula for Serb-Croat demarcation. 
Mediators in the negotiations wished to avoid any additional complications of the already 
highly delicate negotiations with Milosevic, believing that some settlement was better 
than continued fighting and no settlement at all. For Milosevic himself, who had been 
forced to make a series of big and difficult concessions, opening the issue of Kosovo, at 





With regard to the first criterion for outcomes of successful negotiations and 
third-party interventions, as defined in Table 2, the conflict in Kosovo ended with an 
agreement.  
As concerns the second criterion for outcomes of successful negotiations and 
third-party interventions, as defined in Table 2, the agreements in Kosovo stopped the 
fighting, although they lacked in provisions for ethnic reconciliation or multiethnic 
societies. Under these circumstances, the Rambouillet Agreement did not contain any 
ideas on how to make peace among the citizens who have to live with it when 
implemented. Their voice was not heard, because most of the delegates in Rambouillet 
were not representative of the citizens. The terms of the Agreement of June 3rd, 1999 
were similar to those of Rambouillet, except that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia, 
and the occupying forces, though made up largely of NATO countries, would officially 
be acting in the name of the United Nations.  
The outcomes of NATO's intervention as a third party in the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia were not entirely successful. It’s diplomacy during the Bosnia and 
Kosovo conflicts, along with other multinational diplomatic efforts, did not necessarily 
lead to solving the Balkan problem. Although the resolutions of the two conflicts made 
reaching agreements possible, they did not necessarily bring changes in the relationship 
of the disputing sides. Resolution of small issues, such as territorial division, or return of 
refugees, that rested on broad ones, such as ethnic cleansing, hatred, nationalism, and 
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whose causes were not removed, did not lead towards a successful resolution of either 
conflict. Nor did NATO intervention as a third party enable the conflicting parties to set a 
new course. Thus, NATO and the other parties did not effectively settle the issues, such 
as extreme polarization, physical violence, and rancor among the Serbs and Muslim 
Croats on the one hand, and Serbs and Kosovar Albanians on the other hand. A sense of 
isolation, or a fear of abandonment still exist among the Muslim Croats and Kosovar 
Albanians. The efforts to limit escalation of disputes did not entail building interpersonal 







NATO's involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo has indicated the expanded role of 
the Alliance in European and world affairs. Although it is hard to imagine how the 
combatants themselves could ever have stopped the fighting let alone reached agreements 
during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, this does not mean that NATO (and the other 
parties intervening in these conflicts) did effectively solve or manage the conflicts. Did 
NATO fulfill all of the criteria9 required by being an "ideal third party" intervening in 
conflict resolution during both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo conflicts? This thesis 
finds that NATO did not. Neither are the outcomes of its involvement in the efforts to 
solve the two conflicts, examples of successful negotiation and third-party intervention. 
Absence of a definite plan, failure, to converge towards "win-win" versus "win- lose" 
negotiations, the use of quick-fix solutions, and the inappropriate use of coercive 
diplomacy are all criteria, indicated that NATO did no t serve as an ideal third party in 
either Bosnia or Kosovo conflicts. 
During the two conflicts, NATO lacked a clear-cut plan, to figure out what the 
best-expected resolution would be, what a fair and reasonable deal would be, and what a 
minimally acceptable deal would be, and then, to chose the one best fitting the actual 
circumstances.  
                                                 
9 As defined in Table 1, Chapter IV. 
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In Kosovo, by converging towards "win- lose"-type negotiation, NATO forced one 
of the disputing sides to make more concessions and have lesser advantages over the 
other. Thus, the latter felt like it lost, and viewed itself as disregarded, or victimized. 
NATO set forth quick-fix solutions to the conflict in Bosnia, as it wanted to stop 
the fight as rapidly as possible. The root premises of the conflict were not addressed. 
Istead, it dealt with only small disputing issues, and not overarching ones.  
It may well be that conflicts that have the degree of violence and hatred as in the 
former Yugoslavia need coercive diplomacy not negotiation. However, NATO's coercive 





With regard to future conflict resolution and management, in order to create new 
relational structures and possibilities for moderating and halting conflicts, NATO should 
improve its capabilities as a third party in the following areas:  
ü It should try to take an assertive role in the field of preventive diplomacy, or 
conflict prevention, in order to keep conflict from erupting in the beginning, 
instead of trying to mitigate conflicts when they grasp a virtually 
unmanageable status. [Ref.57] 
ü Before taking a role in the process of resolving conflicts, NATO should have a 
plan, in order to try to find out in advance whether the situation is a "win-win" 
or "win- lose" one. It should be sure of its goals, positions, underlying 
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interests, and strategies. On the other hand, NATO should try to identify all 
disputed issues and figure out the conflicting parties' real goals and issues. 
ü When approaching "win-win" negotiations, it is very important that NATO 
make the disputing sides not feel that they "lost," because, situations like this 
may sometimes result in lack of commitment to the agreement, or retaliation.  
ü Coercive diplomacy is both an important and useful tool for conflict 
resolution, but it has to represent neither a substitute for diplomacy nor an 
alternative to using force. It succeeds if it is backed by a credible strategy for 
employing force decisively to achieve explicit objectives. Thus, while using 
coercive diplomacy, NATO (along with the other international organizations) 
should clearly make known to the disputing sides that it will not only punish 
them if they do not refrain from violence and engage in talks, but also help 
them if they do. As vital elements in the conflict are underdevelopment, 
poverty and deepening economic crisis, there is always space for economic 
"carrots." The measures NATO would take to make the present course more 
unpleasant (sticks) and the future alternative more attractive (carrots) have to 
be credible enough all the time while using coercive diplomacy. 
ü In its attempt to solve conflicts, NATO should try to address the root causes of 
the conflict for the conflict resolution to be effective. It is important that 
NATO help the parties understand what makes them the enemy of each other 
(i.e. social-economic-political conditions, dynamics, ideas and ideologies, 
perceptions and misperceptions). The parties may then focus their negative 
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emotions and energies towards the root causes of their conflict and may 
cooperate with each other to eliminate them.  
ü NATO should also be involved (along with impartial international 
organizations) in the creation of citizen reconciliation teams. Reconciliation is 
not needed only after wars: it is much easier to heal psychological wounds 
when lesser people are killed and no material damage happens. 
ü NATO's intervention must take place in the context of an ongoing political 
peace process. NATO should set up plans to implement any peace settlement 
that may be reached. For NATO's intervention to be successful, it should 
understand and exploit the link between diplomacy and military force. 
Linking military intervention to a larger peace process is often the key to 
developing a successful exit strategy. Diplomatic interventions gain their force 
from economic or military backing, while military force requires that 
diplomacy articulate its goals and interests.  
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the challenges in the Balkans remain 
daunting. Despite the successful deployment of NATO's forces in the region and the 
arrest of ethnic cleansing, the stability and security in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
remains perilous while menaced by ethnic hatred, revenge-seekers, and political 
uncertainty. On the other hand, there can be no prospect of lasting peace and stability in 
the Balkans as long as Milosevic still has (certain) power. Longer-term success will 
demand greater efforts to couple military power with the application of stronger 
economic and political mechanisms, which NATO is part of. 
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